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Government officials, advocacy groups, and the business press have raised concerns that
former SEC employees may continue to influence the SEC after leaving the agency. Using
a hand-collected database of individual lawyers that represent firms in responding to SEC
comment letters, we examine the impact of individual lawyers, and lawyers formerly em-
ployed by the SEC, on the comment letter process. We document significant differences
between lawyers and law firms in their clients’ resistance to SEC comment letters, and find
that firms that retain former SEC employees are larger, more profitable, and more likely to
have received a comment letter raising accounting issues. After matching on lawyer, com-
ment letter, and firm characteristics, we find evidence consistent with former SEC employees
increasing resistance in the comment letter process: conversations involving former SEC
employees involve more negotiation, and result in fewer financial statement amendments.
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1. Introduction
“More than half the high-ranking SEC officials who left the agency since January
2016 landed at law and financial firms [...] Firms tout the expertise their recently
acquired colleagues gained at the agency. Government watchdogs, however, cite
concerns about the possible influence these individuals have over their former
co-workers”. (Ramonas, 2017, Bloomberg Law)
“The revolving door between the government and the private sector has long been
presumed to lead to the capture of regulators by industry interests.” (Zheng, 2015)
Between 2001 and 2012, 455 former Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC)
employees, over 10 percent of the number of employees at the SEC in the fiscal year 2012,
disclosed in post-employment statements that they intended to represent an external party
before the SEC. Of the 2,118 post-employment statements filed during the period, about
two-thirds were filed by individuals formerly with the Division of Enforcement or the Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance, which play critical roles in regulating corporate disclosure and
enforcing securities law. Furthermore, these numbers represent only a low estimate of the im-
pact of the revolving door between the SEC and the private sector because post-employment
statements are required only within two years of leaving the SEC.1
The flow of personnel and expertise from the SEC to the private sector has been the
subject of scrutiny and debate by government officials, advocacy groups, the business press,
and academics in recent years. A 2013 report by the Project On Government Oversight
(POGO) expressed the concern that “a rapidly spinning revolving door can weaken the
agency’s protection of investors, enable regulated entities to exert undue influence, demor-
alize other government employees, and damage the public’s trust” (Smallberg, 2013, p. 37),
and much of the recent media coverage on the issue has skewed negatively.2
Critics of the revolving door cite the risk of regulatory capture—the risk that regulators
“created to act in the public interest [...] end up acting directly or indirectly in the interests
of those they regulate.” (Brown, 2016, p. 1). One mechanism for regulatory capture is that
1The number of SEC employees (4,388) is the number of full-time equivalents reported in its 2012 budget
justification to Congress (see SEC, n.d., p. 15). Post-employment statement information is from the Project
On Government Oversight’s SEC Revolving Door Database (see Project On Government Oversight, n.d.).
2For example, see “SEC Lawyer One Day, Opponent the Next” (McGinty, 2010a, The Wall Street Jour-
nal); “SEC ’Revolving Door’ Under Review” (McGinty, 2010b, The Wall Street Journal); “SEC staff’s
’revolving door’ prompts concerns about agency’s independence” (Hilzenrath, 2011, The Washington Post);
and “S.E.C.’s Revolving Door Hurts Its Effectiveness, Report Says” (Protess & Craig, 2013, The New York
Times).
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the revolving door incentivizes individuals at regulatory agencies to act in the interest of
prospective employers while they are at the agencies.3 A second mechanism that is closely
related to and may exacerbate the first is that individuals formerly at regulatory agencies
may continue to influence former colleagues at the agency; this mechanism is a primary
concern of POGO’s 2013 report.4
On the other hand, an alternative argument is that the revolving door improves regulatory
compliance, and that ethics rules should safeguard against conflicts of interest that may arise.
In a 2005 speech, then-SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins said that the revolving door improves
compliance in the private sector because “people with regulatory backgrounds become good
proselytes for lawful behavior” (Atkins, 2005); and in 2007 he said that
“people who leave government to return to industry can help to instill a proper
sense of the importance of complying with legal obligations [...] strong ethics rules
guard against potential conflicts of interest when people leave the government for
the private sector.” (Atkins, 2007)
Former employees of regulatory agencies may also improve regulatory compliance because
of the experience and expertise gained at the agencies. Law firms, for example, frequently
mention in their lawyers’ online biographies if the lawyers were formerly employed by the
SEC, suggesting that this experience is valuable to their clients. This argument is also
related to the human capital hypothesis, an alternative story to regulatory capture: an
agency official may “have an incentive to invest in and/or demonstrate his human capital
skills while at the regulatory agency to increase his future prospects in industry” (deHaan
et al., 2015, p. 66, see also Zheng, 2015).
The legal and political science literatures have discussed the determinants and conse-
quences of regulatory capture and the revolving door between the public and private sectors
since the 1970s.5 However, empirical evidence on the impact of individual lawyers and the
revolving door on financial reporting remains sparse despite the role played by the SEC in
3See deHaan et al. (2015) for recent empirical evidence for and Zheng (2015) for a detailed discussion of
this mechanism, and of the alternative human capital hypothesis.
4For example, “the mere fact that so many waiver requests involve former officials could influence the
way people at the agency think about regulatory relief” (Smallberg, 2013, p. 9); see also Ramonas (2017,
Bloomberg Law): “Government watchdogs, however, cite concerns about the possible influence these indi-
viduals have over their former co-workers”.
5Legal studies on the revolving door include Lacovara (1978), Morgan (1980), Mundheim (1980), Johnson
(1983), Roberts, Jr. (1992), Parker (1998), McGuire (2000), and Zaring (2013). Analytical studies in political
science on regulatory capture include Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Bernheim & Whinston (1986), Tirole
(1986), Laffont & Tirole (1991), and Che (1995); see also Dal Bo´ (2006) for a review of the analytical and
empirical literature on regulatory capture.
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regulating corporate disclosure. deHaan et al. (2015) find that SEC employees who leave the
SEC to join private law firms are associated with more aggressive enforcement while at the
SEC, consistent with the human capital hypothesis. Both deHaan et al. (2015, see Table 6)
and Shive & Forster (2017, see Table IX) examine the impact of former regulatory agency
employees, and both find only weak evidence that they influence enforcement outcomes after
leaving the agencies.6
In our study, we examine whether the involvement of external counsel who were formerly
with the SEC (“SEC-affiliated lawyers”) is associated with resistance in the SEC comment
letter process. This setting allows us to directly examine the impact of the SEC revolving
door on financial reporting, because the comment letter process is a critical element of the
financial reporting system in the United States. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC
to review each company’s filings at least every three years, and the SEC issues comments
when its “staff identifies instances where it believes a company can improve its disclosure or
enhance its compliance” (SEC, 2017).7 Furthermore, firms often involve external counsel in
responding to comment letters: external counsel were involved in over a third of our initial
sample of comment letter conversations (see Table 1; see also Bozanic et al., 2016).
In order to identify the involvement of SEC-affiliated lawyers in the SEC comment letter
process, we retrieve the names of the individual lawyers and law firms involved in each com-
ment letter conversation from Audit Analytics, and hand-collect the characteristics of the
individual lawyers from public sources, restricting the hand-collection to lawyer-law firms
with at least three conversations in our initial sample. Our hand-collected dataset includes
the former SEC employment status, educational background, and other background char-
acteristics of 593 unique lawyers. After attrition our final sample comprises 2,288 comment
letter conversations initiated between 2005 and 2012 that involve external counsel, and about
7.6 percent of the sample involve lawyers who were formerly employed by the SEC.
We first examine the extent to which the variation between individual lawyers explains
the variation in three sets of outcomes after a firm receives an SEC comment: (1) the
6Specifically, both deHaan et al. (2015) and Shive & Forster (2017) find evidence in their respective
settings that former regulatory agency employees reduce damages or fines in regulated firms; however they
find weak or no evidence when examining other proxies of enforcement outcomes. A number of empirical
studies have also examined the revolving door in other contexts: Lucca et al. (2014) examine the revolving
door between bank regulators and the private sector, and Luechinger & Moser (2014) examine stock market
reactions to U.S. Department of Defense appointments. See also Dal Bo´ (2006, p. 216–217) for a review of
studies on the impact of regulatory capture on outcomes in the utilities industries and in trade regulation.
7Consistent with the critical role of the SEC comment letter process in the financial reporting system, the
literature has found that comment letters improve disclosures (Bozanic et al., 2017), have spillover effects
on other firms’ disclosures (Brown et al., 2017), and are associated with higher insider trading than normal
before public disclosure of the comment letters (Dechow et al., 2016).
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amount of negotiation, proxied by the timeliness of comment letter resolution; (2) 10-K or
10-Q amendment filings; and (3) future comment letter conversations, restatements, and
litigation. We carry out two sets of tests; in one we require three observations per lawyer
and law firms, and in the other we require ten observations. Across specifications, we find
that individual lawyer fixed effects and individual law firm fixed effects are both statistically
significant in explaining variation in negotiation and amendments, relative to control vari-
able. Furthermore, lawyer fixed effects have significantly greater explanatory power than
law firm fixed effects. We find mixed results across specifications for future conversations,
restatements, and litigation.
Next, we examine the involvement of SEC-affiliated lawyers in the comment letter pro-
cess. We find significant differences between firms that involve SEC-affiliated lawyers, and
firms that only involve non-affiliated lawyers. In particular, firms that retain former SEC em-
ployees are significantly more likely to be responding to accounting-related comment letters
from the SEC: 85 percent of comment letter conversations involving SEC-affiliated lawyers
were initiated with a comment letter mentioning accounting issues, compared to 78 percent
for conversations involving non-affiliated lawyers. Firms that retain SEC-affiliated lawyers
are also larger, older, more profitable, and more likely to have been sued recently.
Finally, we examine the impact of SEC-affiliated lawyers on resistance in the comment
letter process after matching conversations that do and do not involve SEC-affiliated lawyers.
After matching on all controls—lawyer and law firm characteristics, initial comment letter
characteristics, and firm controls—we find that involving an SEC-affiliated lawyer is associ-
ated with significantly more negotiation, and a significantly lower likelihood and number of
amendments. We interpret our findings as consistent with SEC-affiliated lawyers successfully
exerting their influence to reduce compliance with SEC comments. We find no evidence for
an association between SEC affiliation and future conversations, restatements, and litiga-
tion over the two years following the initial comment letter, suggesting that the influence of
SEC-affiliated lawyers is persistent over time.
Our study aims to contribute to two overlapping streams of research: the literature on the
impact of external counsel on financial reporting, and the literature on SEC comment letters.
The literature on external counsel is sparse likely due to data availability limitations, but
recent studies suggest that lawyers and law firms can affect the financial reporting system
in specific settings.8 In particular, our study is related methodologically to Bozanic et al.
(2016), who find that external counsel involvement increases resistance to the disclosure of
8See, for example, deHaan et al. (2015), Bozanic et al. (2016), Dechow & Tan (2017).
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new information following the receipt of a comment letter, and also affects other financial
reporting outcomes. However, our research question is most closely related to Heese et al.
(2017), who also examine regulatory capture in the SEC comment letter process, but from
a different perspective: they find that firms are more likely to receive a comment letter if
they are politically connected, based on Political Action Committee contributions or lobbying
expenditure, contrary to the regulatory capture hypothesis. Our study, in contrast, examines
outcomes after receiving a comment letter, and we examine regulatory capture in the SEC
comment letter process via lawyers who were formerly employed by the SEC.
2. Hypothesis development
2.1. Individual lawyers
Recent studies have examined the role of corporate general counsel in firms’ disclosure
policies, financial reporting quality, and risk management. For example, Kwak et al. (2012)
document that firms with general counsel in their top management teams are more likely to
issue less optimistic and more accurate management forecasts, especially bad news forecasts.
However, Hopkins et al. (2014) show that firms with highly compensated general counsel
are associated with worse financial reporting quality and adopt more aggressive accounting
policies. Ham & Koharki (2016) find evidence that the appointment of corporate general
counsel to senior management is associated with increases in credit risk.
In our study, in contrast, we examine the impact of firms’ external counsel. Our study
is therefore related to Bozanic et al. (2016), who find that involvement of external counsel
in the SEC comment letter process is associated with greater resistance to disclosing new
information. Our study extends this line of research by examining the impact of individual
lawyers’ characteristics on the comment letter process. Individual lawyers could have a sig-
nificant impact on the comment letter process. For example, from Audit Analytics’ comment
letters database, the lawyer involved in the most conversations has represented at least 30
companies in responding to 59 comment letters since 2005. Anecdotal evidence also suggests
that client firms may select specific lawyers based on their individual expertise: law firms
regularly include biographies of their lawyers on their websites, with detailed information
including educational background and employment history.
The prior literature has also shown that variation between individuals play important
roles in related contexts, including audit quality and credit ratings. For example, Gul et al.
(2013) document that variation between individual auditors affects audit quality, and that
this variation can partially be explained by individual characteristics such as education and
Big N audit firm experience. Guan et al. (2016) find that school ties between audit partners
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and executives of their clients impair audit quality: for example, auditors with school ties
to their clients are more likely to issue favorable opinions, and their clients have higher
discretionary accruals and are more likely to restate earnings. Fracassi et al. (2016) find that
variation between individual credit analysts is associated with variation in firms’ long-term
credit ratings, and affects the cost of debt.
Motivated by the influence of individual lawyers in the comment letter process, and the
importance of individual lawyers’ characteristics to clients of law firms, we first establish
whether variation in measures of resistance to SEC comment letters can be explained by
variation between individual lawyers. Our first hypotheses, in null form, is therefore as
follows:
Hypothesis 1. There is no difference between individual lawyers in their clients’ resistance
to SEC comment letters.
2.2. Impact of SEC affiliation
Our next goal is to examine whether a specific characteristic of individual lawyers—
former employment with the SEC—affects resistance to SEC comment letters. The flow of
personnel from the SEC to the private sector has been the subject of debate and scrutiny by
a wide range of stakeholders, with critics concerned about the risk of regulatory capture (see
Smallberg 2013, for example). One mechanism for regulatory capture of the SEC is that the
revolving door between the SEC and the private sector may incentivize individuals at the
SEC to act in the interest of prospective employers while they are at the agency. For example,
deHaan et al. (2015) find that SEC employees who leave the SEC to join private law firms
are associated with more aggressive enforcement while they are at the SEC, inconsistent
with regulatory capture.
A second mechanism is that individuals formerly at the SEC may influence SEC staff in
favor of their clients after they join the private sector. This mechanism is a primary concern
of POGO’s 2013 report (see Smallberg, 2013), and has received negative attention from the
business press in recent years. For example, McGinty (2010a, The Wall Street Journal)
highlighted how a former enforcement lawyer at the SEC represented a client in responding
to an SEC request for information just eleven days after leaving the SEC. The article also
cites a former SEC lawyer’s comment that the “training and expertise gained at the SEC is
put to use for the benefit of those working against the interests of investors”.
On the other hand, former SEC employees may in fact improve regulatory compliance by
their clients. Then-SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins said that former employees of regulatory
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agencies encourage compliance in the private sector, and that ethics rules safeguard against
conflicts of interest (Atkins, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, the evidence in deHaan et al. (2015)
suggests that SEC employees believe that aggressive enforcement is valuable to the private
sector. We therefore examine two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.
2a: Involvement of an SEC-affiliated lawyer is associated with greater resistance to SEC
comment letters.
2b: Involvement of an SEC-affiliated lawyer is associated with lower resistance to SEC com-
ment letters.
2.3. Measures of resistance
In this study, we examine three sets of outcomes after a firm receives a comment letter
from the SEC: (1) the extent of negotiation; (2) 10-K or 10-Q amendment filings; and (3)
future comment letter conversations, restatements, and litigation.9
If an external counsel uses his or her influence in the comment letter process for the
benefit of a client, we would expect to observe greater negotiation with the SEC, and fewer
amendment filings as a result of the SEC’s comments. We proxy for the extent of negotiation
by respondents using the timeliness of resolution, similar to Bozanic et al. (2017). Specifically,
we use three proxies for negotiation: the time in days between the first and last letters
in the conversation, the number of comment letters in the conversation, and a dummy if
the conversation takes at least two rounds of exchanges between the firm and the SEC to
resolve.10 Next, similar to Bozanic et al. (2016), we measure amendment filings using 10-K
or 10-Q amendments filed between the first comment letter in the conversation and 90 days
after the last comment letter. We use two proxies: the number of amendments filed, and a
dummy for whether an amendment was filed.
Greater resistance to SEC comments could lead to an increased likelihood of future
comment letter conversations, restatements, and even litigation, if the firm is ultimately
forced to correct its disclosures. However, we caution that this prediction would not hold
if, for example, the influence of external counsel on the SEC is persistent over the long run,
9Please see Appendix A for formal variable definitions.
10That is, the conversation comprises at least five letters. We note that the timeliness of resolution has
also been used as a proxy for the cost of remediation (Cassell et al., 2013), which could be correlated to
whether a firm retains an SEC-affiliated lawyer. We mitigate this issue by matching along characteristics of
the initial comment letter in one of the specifications of our tests of Hypothesis 2.
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so that a firm is able to avoid corrections over multiple years. Following Bozanic et al.
(2016), we examine future comment letter conversations and restatements during the two
years following the start of the focal conversation. Using a two-year window for future
conversations captures “off-cycle” comment letters because the SEC reviews company filings
at least once every three years (Bozanic et al., 2016). Similarly, we use securities lawsuit
filings during the two years following the start of the conversation.
3. Research design
3.1. Individual lawyers
We examine whether variation between individual lawyers explains outcomes after re-
ceiving a comment letter by testing the joint significance of individual lawyer fixed effects.
In our main tests, we compare models with lawyer fixed effects, initial comment letter con-
trols, and firm controls against base models with only initial comment letter controls and
firm controls.11 A statistically significant improvement in model fit suggests that variation
between individual lawyers is incremental to the control variables in explaining variation in
comment letter outcomes. In addition, we compare the joint significance of individual lawyer
fixed effects with that of law firm fixed effects.
We therefore estimate the following regression models for each of the response variables:
Comment Letter Outcome = α + γ Controls (1)
Comment Letter Outcome = α + β Law Firm Fixed Effects + γ Controls (2)
Comment Letter Outcome = α + β Lawyer Fixed Effects + γ Controls (3)
For each response variable, we use likelihood ratio tests to compare the goodness of fit of
Models 1 and 3, and Vuong tests to compare Models 2 and 3, because the latter models are
non-nested. We begin our analyses using law firms involved in at least three conversations.
We also replicate the tests using law firms involved in at least ten conversations, which
mitigates overfitting but reduces the sample to conversations involving more experienced
law firms.
3.2. Impact of SEC affiliation
We examine the impact of SEC affiliation on comment letter outcomes by regressing each
outcome variable against a dummy variable (SEC) that takes the value of one if the firm
11Please see Section 3.3 for details on our control variables, and Appendix A for variable definitions.
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referenced an SEC-affiliated lawyer in a comment letter, and zero otherwise:
Negotiation = α + β SEC + γ Controls (4)
Amendments = α + β1 SEC + β2 NumLetters+ γ Controls (5)
Future Outcomes = α + β1 SEC + β2 NumLetters+ β3 Amendment+ γ Controls (6)
We include lawyer, law firm, comment letter, and firm controls as detailed in Section 3.3.
We include a proxy for the extent of negotiation, NumLetters, in Equations 5 and 6, so that
the regressions estimate the effect of involving SEC-affiliated lawyers directly, controlling for
any indirect effect via the extent of negotiation. Likewise, we include Amendment, a dummy
variable indicating whether a firm filed an amendment, in Equation 6.
To further mitigate bias due to confounding, we propensity-match treatment (SEC = 1)
and control (SEC = 0) conversations. When estimating Equations 4, 5, and 6, we match
treatment and control conversations using the following logistic models respectively:
SEC = α + γ Covariates (7)
SEC = α + β NumLetters+ γ Covariates (8)
SEC = α + β1 NumLetters+ β2 Amendment+ γ Covariates (9)
We propensity-match treatment and control conversations using two methods with different
sets of covariates:
• In our first matching method, we include lawyer and law firm characteristics as
covariates, because they are important sources of difference between treatment and
control observations (see Table 7).
• In our second matching method, we use all the control variables: lawyer and law
firm characteristics, initial comment letter controls, and firm controls.
For both methods, we include industry fixed effects as covariates to take into account po-
tential differences between departments within the SEC (see Baugh et al. 2017, Appendix
A). We use full matching (Rosenbaum, 1991), which carries out one-to-many matching of
treatment (SEC = 1) and control (SEC = 0) observations to minimize the differences in
their propensity scores within subgroups. Observations not in the support of the propensity
score are omitted before matching, and the matching procedure constructs a set of weights
10
that we apply to each observation remaining in the sample.12
In additional analyses, we control for variation between law firms by replacing the law
firm expertise control variable (LawFirmExp) with law firm fixed effects. For these tests,
we restrict the data to conversations represented by law firms involved in at least 10 con-
versations in order to mitigate the problem of perfect separation. For example, for our
amendments tests, before imposing this restriction about 38 percent of the law firms in the
sample are not involved in comment letters conversations that lead to amendments. How-
ever, a caveat of this restriction is that it reduces the sample to conversations involving more
experienced law firms.13
3.3. Control variables
We use three sets of control variables in this study: lawyer and law firm characteristics,
characteristics of the initial comment letter in the conversation, and firm controls. Please see
Appendix A for detailed definitions of the variables used in our study, including the control
variables.
Our lawyer and law firm controls are constructed from our hand-collected database de-
scribed in more detail in Section 4. In order to control for the impact of securities law
expertise (e.g. Bozanic et al., 2016), we include proxies for lawyers’ and law firms’ experi-
ence in the comment letter process—the number of comment letter conversations involving
the lawyer or law firm over the previous year (LawyerExp and LawFirmExp respectively).
We further control for other characteristics that may be correlated with expertise, including
the lawyers’ education (TopSchool and NumDegrees) and age (LawyerAge). We include a
control for the lawyer’s gender (Female), and a control for the number of lawyers referenced
during the conversation (NumLawyers) because this would be mechanically correlated with
the probability that a given lawyer was formerly employed by the SEC.
Next, we control for a set of characteristics of the initial comment letter in the con-
12When matching along lawyer and law firm characteristics, we carry out the matching procedure within
years. In other words, a treatment conversation can only be matched to control conversations that begin in
the same calendar year. When matching along all controls, we relax this requirement and match within two-
year windows, due to perfect separation within certain years; that is, in certain years, specific combinations
of covariates perfectly predict the treatment.
13When estimating the model with law firm fixed effects, we do not use the above propensity-matching
methods because the procedures involve further attrition. This additional attrition would then generate
more law firms involved in less than 10 conversations that would have to be omitted from the sample, which
would then necessitate repeating the matching procedure, and so on iteratively. We avoid this problem by
starting with the sample after matching on all controls (the second matching method), and running the
regressions without weighting. This allows us to maintain the restriction of at least 10 conversations per
lawyer, while omitting extreme conversations that are outside the support of the propensity score.
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versation, and a set of firm characteristics, similar to Bozanic et al. (2016). We include
NumFilings, the number of SEC filings referenced by the initial comment letter, and Acc,
RegSK, RegSX, Risk, and Regis, dummy variables equal to one if the initial comment let-
ter referenced accounting rule, Regulation S-X, Regulation S-K, risk factor, or registration
issues. We include a dummy variable, Other, equal to one if the comment letter references
issues that do not fit other categories, as coded by Audit Analytics. We control for a large set
of firm characteristics, including size, age, profitability, R&D, returns, and returns volatility,
and past restatements and litigation (see Appendix A). Finally, we include industry fixed
effects based on one-digit SIC codes to control for possible variation between offices at the
SEC. Review of filings at the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance is organized by office,
with a given office covering a broad industry group; see, for example, Baugh et al. (2017,
Appendix A).
4. Sample and descriptives
4.1. Sample selection and data sources
We retrieve comment letter conversations from Audit Analytics’ Comment Letter Conver-
sations database, beginning with 70,940 completed comment letter conversations initiated
between 2005 and 2012.14 Our sample period and initial sample selection procedure (see
Panel A of Table 1) follows Bozanic et al. (2016) closely. We require the firms in the con-
versations to be covered by Compustat as of the most recent fiscal year, and by CRSP as
of the starting date of the conversation. This reduces the sample to 24,449 conversations
involving 6,920 unique firms. Next, we require conversations to reference a 10-K filing, fur-
ther reducing the sample to 12,252 conversations.15 Similar to Bozanic et al. (2016), we
omit conversations with only one letter and conversations below the bottom percentile of
the time to resolution.16 These steps result in an initial sample of 11,974 comment letter
conversations involving 4,932 unique firms.
Next, we retrieve and require legal advisor data (see Panel B of Table 1). We retrieve data
on law firm personnel referenced in firms’ replies to SEC comment letters (i.e., CORRESP
files) using the People Search tool on auditanalytics.com, restricting the search to comment
14In other words, we require the first comment letter date (first letter date) to be between 2005 and 2012
inclusive.
15Comment letter conversations are unlikely to reference a 10-Q filing without referencing a 10-K filing: the
sample size at this step (12,252 conversations) is only slightly smaller than the sample size had we included
all periodic filings (12,462 conversations).
16We define the time to resolution as the number of days between the first and last comment letter in the
conversation. The bottom percentile before this attrition step is seven days.
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Table 1: Sample selection
Unique Unique Unique
conversations firm-years firms
Panel A: Initial sample selection
Conversations initiated between 2005 and 2012 70,940 - -
Require Compustat coverage 35,845 25,409 9,674
Require CRSP coverage 24,449 18,661 6,920
Restrict to conversations that reference a 10-K filing 12,252 12,072 4,965
Omit conversations with only one letter 12,054 11,968 4,944
Omit conversations in the bottom 1% of time to resolution 11,974 11,900 4,932
Panel B: Requiring legal advisor data and variables for analysis
Restrict to conversations referencing legal counsel† 4,033 4,016 2,317
Require lawyer-law firm to have at least three conversations‡ 2,481 2,468 1,289
Require the availability of hand-collected lawyer characteristics 2,455 2,442 1,275
Require the availability of variables used in the analyses 2,288 2,277 1,201
† We also omit 61 conversations in which the lawyer was not named. The 4,033 conversations at
this step involve 2,485 unique lawyers and 491 unique law firms.
‡ After requiring lawyer-law firms with at least three conversations, there are 603 unique lawyers
and 199 unique law firms associated with the conversations in the sample.
letters referencing periodic filings. Of the 11,974 conversations in our initial sample, 4,033
conversations have replies by firms in which lawyers were referenced.17 In other words, firms
involved lawyers in about 34% of conversations, close to the proportion documented by
Bozanic et al. (2016). In these 4,033 conversations, firms referenced a total of 2,485 unique
lawyers and 491 unique law firms.
We next require the availability of hand-collected data on the background characteristics
of lawyers referenced in firms’ replies. For each unique lawyer-law firm combination, the
characteristics we collect include the lawyer’s educational history, gender, and SEC affiliation
before joining the law firm, if any. We collect the data from public sources, primarily LinkedIn
profiles and biographies on law firm websites. We restrict our hand-collection to the lawyer-
law firms with at least three conversations in our initial sample, because our tests of lawyer
and law firm fixed effects require multiple observations per lawyer or law firm.18 This restricts
the sample to 2,481 conversations involving 603 unique lawyers and 199 unique law firms.
17We omitted 61 conversations in which the lawyers were not named.
18Our cutoff of three conversations also reflects a trade-off between spending substantially more time to
collect a more comprehensive sample, and focusing on the lawyers and law firms that have greater represen-
tation in the sample.
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We were able to collect data for 593 unique lawyers from 194 unique law firms. After
restricting our sample to conversations with hand-collected lawyer-law firm data, we have
2,455 unique conversations involving 1,275 unique firms. In other words, unavailability of
public sources for our hand-collection resulted in about a 1.0% decline in our sample size,
and about a 1.7% decline in unique lawyers.19 Finally, we require the availability of variables
used in our analyses, resulting in a final sample of 2,288 conversations involving 1,201 unique
firms. The number of unique firm-years in the sample, 2,277, is very close to the sample size,
indicating that the conversations in our sample map almost uniquely to firm-years.
4.2. Descriptive statistics: lawyer characteristics
Our hand-collected dataset comprises 596 unique combinations of lawyers and law firms.
We collect the data at the lawyer-law firm level to take moves between law firms into account.
For example, to collect the SEC variable, we examine whether the lawyer was employed by
the SEC before joining the focal law firm. Nevertheless, the lawyers in our sample very
rarely switch law firms: there are 593 unique lawyers in our data, meaning that at most only
three lawyers switched law firms. In addition, there are 194 unique law firms in our sample,
indicating that each law firm has three lawyers representing firms in our sample on average.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show descriptive statistics for our dataset.20 Panel A of Table 2
documents the characteristics of the 593 unique lawyers in our dataset. On average, a lawyer
is referenced in about 4.8 comment letter conversations, and are almost always associated
with only one unique law firm throughout the sample. About 5.6% of lawyers had been
employed with the SEC, about 59.7% attended a university with a top-14 law school, and
about 14.8% of the lawyers are female. Most lawyers have two degrees—generally a bachelor’s
degree and a Juris Doctor degree.21 Panel B of Table 2 documents the proportion of lawyers
that attended each university with a top-14 law school; of these universities, Harvard is
the most represented, with 13.0% of lawyers, while the University of Chicago is the least
represented (1.7%).22
19To the extent that missing lawyer characteristics are due to lawyer retirements, our sample may be
biased very slightly towards comment letter conversations involving younger lawyers.
20Unless otherwise stated, the descriptives in this subsection are based on raw values, without winsorization
or other outlier removal method.
21We were unable to collect educational information for a small proportion of the lawyer-law firm observa-
tions: 1.5% have no information on educational institutions, and 7.0% have no information on degree dates.
To avoid further sample size reduction, we assume that lawyers have a minimum of two degrees, and that
lawyers for whom educational institutions could not be retrieved did not attend universities with top-14 law
schools. However, cases with missing degree dates (needed to construct LawyerAge) are dropped from final
sample.
22The proportions do not sum to the total proportion of lawyers attending top universities because some
lawyers may attend top universities twice, for example at the undergraduate and graduate level respectively.
14
Table 2: Descriptives of the lawyer characteristics database
Panel A: Characteristics per unique lawyer
N Mean SD Q1 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q99
# Conversations 593 4.782 3.003 3 3 4 5 18
# Law firms 593 1.005 0.071 1 1 1 1 1
SEC 593 0.056 0.229 0 0 0 0 1
TopSchool 593 0.597 0.491 0 0 1 1 1
NumDegrees 593 2.155 0.385 2 2 2 2 3
Female 593 0.148 0.356 0 0 0 0 1
Panel B: University representation
University # of Lawyers % of Lawyers
Harvard University 77 13.0
University of Virginia 39 6.6
University of Pennsylvania 37 6.2
Stanford University 35 5.9
Georgetown University 32 5.4
New York University 32 5.4
Yale University 32 5.4
Cornell University 31 5.2
University of California, Berkeley 28 4.7
University of Michigan 28 4.7
Columbia University 25 4.2
Duke University 19 3.2
Northwestern University 14 2.4
University of Chicago 10 1.7
Universities with top-14 law schools 354 59.7
Without top-14 law schools 239 40.3
Total 593 100
This table shows descriptive statistics of our hand-collected database of
lawyer characteristics, which comprises 596 unique combinations of lawyers
and law firms. In Panel A, # Conversations is the number of comment
letter conversations referencing the lawyer, before requiring the availability
of other variables, and # Law firms is the number unique law firms the
lawyer is associated with in our sample; the other variables in Panel A are as
defined in Appendix A. Panel B documents the proportion of unique lawyers
attending each university with a top-14 law school. The total proportions
may not sum to the proportion of lawyers attending any university with a
top-14 law school because lawyers may attend more than one top university.
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Figure 1: Year the lawyers earned their first degrees
This figure shows the histogram of the earliest years each lawyer in our sample earned a degree. Our sample
includes 593 unique lawyers, 551 (92.9%) of whom have degree year data.
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the first year each lawyer in our sample earned a degree,
for the 551 lawyers for whom degree year data is available. The median lawyer in our sample
earned his or her first degree in 1985, about 23 years before the middle of our sample period.
About 50% of the lawyers earned their first degree between 1977 and 1991 inclusive.
4.3. Descriptive statistics: comment letter conversations
Table 3 documents descriptive statistics for our sample at the conversation level, which is
the unit of observation in our study. There are 2,288 conversations in our final sample. At the
conversation level, we reduce the impact of outliers by winsorizing annually count variables
such as NumAmend and NumFilings at the top percentile, and other non-discrete variables
such as ConvT ime and ROA at the top and bottom percentiles.23 Please see Appendix A
for variable definitions.
Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the outcome variables. The median log-
transformed conversation time is 4.159, corresponding to 63 days. A conversation comprises
five letters at the median, and 55.2% of conversations have at least five letters. There
is high variation in conversation length: at the first quartile a conversation lasts 35 days
23We do not winsorize variables based on returns, specifically BHR and StdRet.
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and comprises three letters, while at the third quartile a conversation lasts 108 days and
comprises six letters. About 19.3% of conversations result in a 10-K or 10-Q amendment,
and the mean number of amendments is higher, at 0.263, because some conversations result
in more than one amendment. Respectively, 59.5%, 13.2%, and 5.2% of conversations are
followed by a new comment letter conversation, an adverse restatement, and a class action
lawsuit over the two years following the start of the conversation.
Panel B of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the lawyer and law firm characteris-
tics.24 About 7.6% of conversations involve a lawyer who previously worked at the SEC.
This is higher than the 5.6% at the lawyer level (see Panel A of Table 2), suggesting that
on average, a lawyer who was previously employed by the SEC is involved in more conver-
sations in the sample than a lawyer who was not. On average, the most experienced lawyer
in the conversation was involved in close to one other conversation in the year before the
focal conversation, the most experienced law firm in the conversation was involved in about
nine other conversations, and a conversation involves about 1.15 lawyers. About 65.3% of
conversations involve a lawyer who attended a university with a top-14 law school, and most
lawyers have at most two degrees. The median log-transformed age of the oldest lawyer in
the conversation is 3.296, corresponding to 26 years between the start of the conversation
and the year of the lawyer’s first degree, and 15.2% of conversations involve female lawyers.
Panel C of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the comment letter controls. These
variables are based on the initial comment letter in a conversation. The initial comment
letters reference about two filings on average, and most (79.0%) reference accounting rule
issues as coded by Audit Analytics. In addition, Regulation S-X, Regulation S-K, risk
factor, and registration issues are referenced 17.1%, 59.1%, 12.5%, and 17.0% of the time
respectively. Many issues, however, do not fit Audit Analytics’ categories: 82.7% had issues
not specifically classified by Audit Analytics.
Finally, Panel D of Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the firm controls. Unless
otherwise stated, the firm controls are based on the most recent fiscal year ended before the
start of a conversation. The median log-transformed firm size and age are 6.607 and 2.608
respectively, corresponding to a market capitalization of $740 million, and about 13 years
since the firm’s first appearance in CRSP. On average, the firms’ book-to-market ratio is
0.575, return on assets is about −1%, and R&D intensity is about 6.2%. 63.9% of firms were
24These variables have been aggregated to the conversation level in the case of conversations involving
more than one lawyer or law firm. Specifically, we use the maximum values of LawyerExp, LawFirmExp,
NumDegrees, and LawyerAge for such conversations. About 14.2% of conversations involve more than one
lawyer.
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Figure 2: Distribution of conversation start dates over time
This figure shows the distribution of the first comment letter dates of the 2,288 conversations in our final
sample, over the sample period.
incorporated in Delaware, 94.9% of firms are domestic, and 79.7% are audited by a Big Four
firm. The average raw buy-and-hold return over the 12 months prior to the conversation is
8.1%, and the standard deviation of returns over the 12 months is 0.139. The percentage of
firms with adverse restatements and with class action litigation filings over the three years
before the conversation is 19.0% and 7.0% respectively.
Figure 2 plots a histogram of the start dates of the conversations in our final sample,
grouped by month. There are relatively more observations in the middle years of our sample
period: slightly less than half (47.2%) of the conversations in our sample began between
2008 and 2010 inclusive. There is also some within-year pattern to the initial comment
letter dates: conversations are generally less likely to be initiated in January and February,
and in certain years there are large increases in initiations in December.
5. Individual lawyers
5.1. At least three clients
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine whether lawyer fixed effects have incremental explana-
tory power over the control variables and over law firm fixed effects, for each of the outcome
variables. In other words, for each outcome variable we compare the goodness of fit of Equa-
tions 1 and 3, and Equations 2 and 3 respectively. In this subsection, we require lawyers and
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Table 3: Descriptives of the comment letter conversations sample
N Mean SD Q1 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q99
Panel A: Outcome variables
ConvT ime 2, 288 4.149 0.797 2.485 3.584 4.159 4.691 5.923
NumLetters 2, 288 5.280 2.567 2 3 5 6 14
MultiRound 2, 288 0.552 0.497 0 0 1 1 1
NumAmend 2, 288 0.263 0.598 0 0 0 0 2
Amendment 2, 288 0.193 0.395 0 0 0 0 1
FutureConv 2, 288 0.595 0.491 0 0 1 1 1
FutureRes 2, 288 0.132 0.338 0 0 0 0 1
FutureLit 2, 288 0.052 0.223 0 0 0 0 1
Panel B: Lawyer and law firm characteristics
SEC 2, 288 0.076 0.266 0 0 0 0 1
LawyerExp 2, 288 0.930 1.651 0 0 0 1 6
LawFirmExp 2, 288 9.212 9.402 0 2 6 12 39
NumLawyers 2, 288 1.147 0.369 1 1 1 1 2
TopSchool 2, 288 0.653 0.476 0 0 1 1 1
NumDegrees 2, 288 2.175 0.386 2 2 2 2 3
LawyerAge 2, 288 3.254 0.316 2.485 3.045 3.296 3.497 3.829
Female 2, 288 0.152 0.359 0 0 0 0 1
Panel C: Initial comment letter controls
NumFilings 2, 288 1.942 1.007 1 1 2 2 5
Acc 2, 288 0.790 0.408 0 1 1 1 1
RegSX 2, 288 0.171 0.376 0 0 0 0 1
RegSK 2, 288 0.591 0.492 0 0 1 1 1
Risk 2, 288 0.125 0.330 0 0 0 0 1
Regis 2, 288 0.170 0.376 0 0 0 0 1
Other 2, 288 0.827 0.378 0 1 1 1 1
Panel D: Firm controls
Size 2, 288 6.612 1.828 2.624 5.316 6.607 7.897 11.244
FirmAge 2, 288 2.528 0.804 0.792 1.997 2.608 3.032 4.370
BTM 2, 288 0.575 0.688 -0.508 0.250 0.457 0.757 3.007
ROA 2, 288 -0.010 0.206 -0.839 -0.022 0.026 0.074 0.412
RD 2, 288 0.062 0.114 0 0 0 0.082 0.547
Delaware 2, 288 0.639 0.481 0 0 1 1 1
Domestic 2, 288 0.949 0.220 0 1 1 1 1
BigFour 2, 288 0.797 0.402 0 1 1 1 1
BHR 2, 288 0.081 0.610 -0.848 -0.281 -0.00000 0.299 2.390
StdRet 2, 288 0.139 0.094 0.031 0.080 0.117 0.171 0.525
PastRes 2, 288 0.190 0.392 0 0 0 0 1
PastLit 2, 288 0.070 0.255 0 0 0 0 1
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study, for the 2,288 comment
letter conversations in our final sample. Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. Each
year, we winsorize count variables such as NumAmend and NumFilings at the top percentile,
and other non-discrete variables such as ConvT ime and ROA at the top and bottom percentiles.
We do not winsorize variables based on returns, specifically BHR and StdRet.
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law firms to have at least three clients in the sample. This requirement reduces the sample
to 2,279 conversations involving 179 unique law firms and 556 unique lawyers. Table 4 doc-
uments our results; please see Appendix A for formal variable definitions. In Section 5.2,
we replicate the analyses after requiring lawyers and law firms to have a minimum of ten
clients, which reduces the sample size dramatically but mitigates overfitting.25
Panel A of Table 4 reports model fits using only comment letter and firm controls,
including year and industry fixed effects (Equation 1). The first five columns suggest that
the comment letter and firm controls explain between 7.43 and 10.46 percent of the variation
in negotiation and amendments. However, there is more variation in the extent to which
the controls explain outcomes over the two years following the start of the comment letter
conversations: they explain about 8.69 percent of the variation in future comment letters,
but only two to four percent of the variation in future litigation and restatements. Panel
B of Table 4 suggests that adding law firm fixed effects increases the adjusted R-squared
across all models by between 5.73 and 88.11 percent despite the penalty from adding more
variables. The results of the likelihood ratio tests show that the law firm fixed effects are
jointly significant in explaining all of the outcome variables except FutureConv, relative to
the controls.
Finally, we examine lawyer fixed effects in Panel C of Table 4. Across all outcome vari-
ables, variation between individual lawyers is jointly significant in explaining the variation
in outcomes relative to the control variables, with the adjusted R-squared increasing sub-
stantially in all outcomes despite the penalty to adding additional explanatory variables. In
addition, the results of the Vuong tests indicate that models with controls and lawyer fixed
effects fit significantly better than models with controls and law firm fixed effects, again with
the adjusted R-squared increasing in all outcomes.
5.2. At least ten clients
We next replicate the analyses in Section 5.1, except that we require lawyers and law firms
to have at least ten observations in the sample. The results are documented at Table 5 This
reduces the sample size to only 415 conversations involving 18 unique law firms and 28 unique
lawyers. Requiring a minimum of ten observations mitigates overfitting, but an important
caveat is that this sample may not be representative of our full sample; in particular, it
would be biased towards clients of the largest law firms and most experienced lawyers.
25In addition, we use linear models across all outcomes so that measures of model fit (particularly the
adjusted R-squared) is comparable across models, and to avoid the problem of complete separation in binary
models.
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Table 4: Impact of lawyer fixed effects, requiring three observations per lawyer and law firm (N = 2,279)
Panel A: Models with comment letter and firm controls only
ConvT ime NumLetters MultiRound NumAmend Amendment FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
R¯
2
8.96% 8.29% 7.43% 10.46% 8.80% 8.69% 3.85% 2.28%
χ2∅ 249.27 232.44 211.26 287.20 245.21 242.44 124.86 87.96
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)
Panel B: Models with controls and law firm fixed effects
ConvT ime NumLetters MultiRound NumAmend Amendment FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
R¯
2
10.09% 11.02% 7.86% 12.25% 10.97% 8.77% 5.41% 4.30%
χ2∅ 466.03 489.87 410.21 521.60 488.49 432.85 350.42 323.84
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)
%∆R¯
2
C 12.55% 33.00% 5.73% 17.08% 24.64% 0.91% 40.31% 88.11%
χ2C 216.76 257.43 198.94 234.40 243.28 190.41 225.56 235.88
(p-value) (2.52%) (< 1%) (13.48%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (24.88%) (< 1%) (< 1%)
Panel C: Models with controls and lawyer fixed effects
ConvT ime NumLetters MultiRound NumAmend Amendment FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
R¯
2
13.22% 15.10% 8.93% 13.25% 12.32% 9.90% 13.10% 9.53%
χ2∅ 1, 001.02 1, 050.84 890.89 1, 001.69 977.49 915.34 997.67 906.12
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)
%∆R¯
2
C 47.56% 82.23% 20.15% 26.62% 40.05% 13.94% 239.82% 317.34%
χ2C 751.74 818.41 679.63 714.49 732.28 672.90 872.81 818.16
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)
%∆R¯
2
LF 31.11% 37.01% 13.64% 8.15% 12.36% 12.92% 142.20% 121.86%
Z2LF 11.59 8.82 12.13 8.61 10.90 12.39 10.41 7.24
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)
This table documents the model fit when regressing each of the conversation outcome variables against respective
sets of controls and fixed effects using least squares, and examines the joint significance of lawyer fixed effects,
comparing it with the joint significance of law firm fixed effects. We restrict the data to lawyers and law firms
with at least three observations in the final sample, reducing the sample to 2,279 conversations involving 179
unique law firms and 556 unique lawyers. Panel A documents the fit of models with only comment letter and firm
controls. Panel B documents the fit of models with controls and law firm fixed effects, and examines the joint
significance of law firm fixed effects. Panel C documents the fit of models with controls and lawyer fixed effects,




: Adjusted R-squared of the model.
χ2∅: Likelihood ratio test statistic, comparing against the intercept model.
%∆R¯
2
C : % increase in adjusted R-squared, relative to the model with controls only.
χ2C : Likelihood ratio test statistic, comparing against the model with controls only.
%∆R¯
2
LF : % increase in adjusted R-squared, relative to the model with controls and law firm fixed effects.
Z2LF : Vuong test statistic, comparing against the model with controls and law firm fixed effects.
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Table 5: Impact of lawyer fixed effects, requiring ten observations per lawyer and law firm (N = 415)
Panel A: Models with comment letter and firm controls only
ConvT ime NumLetters MultiRound NumAmend Amendment FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
R¯
2
14.77% 9.74% 7.96% 9.63% 5.78% 7.22% 5.04% 1.73%
χ2∅ 101.87 78.10 69.98 77.60 60.27 66.65 57.04 42.81
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (14.29%)
Panel B: Models with controls and law firm fixed effects
ConvT ime NumLetters MultiRound NumAmend Amendment FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
R¯
2
18.00% 11.43% 10.60% 10.80% 7.14% 6.94% 6.34% 1.01%
χ2∅ 138.08 106.09 102.22 103.12 86.45 85.55 82.88 59.90
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (21.10%)
%∆R¯
2
C 21.93% 17.35% 33.25% 12.09% 23.56% -3.86% 25.71% -41.91%
χ2C 36.22 27.99 32.24 25.52 26.18 18.90 25.85 17.09
(p-value) (< 1%) (6.23%) (2.06%) (11.12%) (9.57%) (39.83%) (10.34%) (51.72%)
Panel C: Models with controls and lawyer fixed effects
ConvT ime NumLetters MultiRound NumAmend Amendment FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
R¯
2
21.80% 15.46% 12.52% 12.95% 10.71% 9.16% 3.92% 6.21%
χ2∅ 169.39 137.03 122.83 124.88 114.33 107.20 83.94 93.94
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (3.33%) (< 1%)
%∆R¯
2
C 47.66% 58.69% 57.33% 34.44% 85.27% 26.92% -22.18% 258.78%
χ2C 67.52 58.92 52.86 47.29 54.06 40.55 26.90 51.13
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (1.28%) (< 1%) (5.90%) (52.35%) (< 1%)
%∆R¯
2
LF 21.10% 35.22% 18.07% 19.94% 49.94% 32.02% -38.10% 517.63%
Z2LF 2.74 2.63 2.12 2.10 2.38 2.42 0.14 2.63
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (1.68%) (1.77%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (44.44%) (< 1%)
This table documents the model fit when regressing each of the conversation outcome variables against respective
sets of controls and fixed effects using least squares, and examines the joint significance of lawyer fixed effects,
comparing it with the joint significance of law firm fixed effects. We restrict the data to lawyers and law firms
with at least ten observations in the final sample, reducing the sample to 415 conversations involving 18 unique
law firms and 28 unique lawyers. Panel A documents the fit of models with only comment letter and firm controls.
Panel B documents the fit of models with controls and law firm fixed effects, and examines the joint significance
of law firm fixed effects. Panel C documents the fit of models with controls and lawyer fixed effects, examines the




: Adjusted R-squared of the model.
χ2∅: Likelihood ratio test statistic, comparing against the intercept model.
%∆R¯
2
C : % increase in adjusted R-squared, relative to the model with controls only.
χ2C : Likelihood ratio test statistic, comparing against the model with controls only.
%∆R¯
2
LF : % increase in adjusted R-squared, relative to the model with controls and law firm fixed effects.
Z2LF : Vuong test statistic, comparing against the model with controls and law firm fixed effects.
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The results documented in Panel A of Table 5 suggest that at conventional significance
levels, the controls are significant in explaining all the comment letter outcomes variables
with the exception of FutureLit. The results in Panel B suggest that variation between law
firms is significant or weakly significant in explaining the variation in conversation length
and amendments relative to the control variables; however the impact of law firms is mixed
in explaining future comment letters, restatements, and litigation.
Panel C of Table 5 documents the joint significance of lawyer fixed effects relative to the
firm and comment letter controls, and compares the fit of models with lawyer fixed effects
with models with law firm fixed effects. We find that across all comment letter outcomes
other than FutureRes, the variation between individual lawyers is significant in explaining
comment letter outcomes relative to comment letter and firm controls, with an increase in
adjusted R-squared between 26.92 and 258.78 percent. Similarly, across all outcomes other
than FutureRes, models with controls and lawyer fixed effects fit significantly better than
models with law firm fixed effects.
6. SEC affiliation
6.1. Univariate tests
To examine Hypothesis 2, we first examine univariate differences in outcomes after the
receipt of an SEC comment letter, between firms do and do not involve SEC-affiliated lawyers
(SEC = 1 or 0). We report the univariate differences at Table 6.
Panel A of Table 6 documents the results based on the full sample. The univariate results
generally suggest that SEC affiliation is associated with significantly more negotiation. The
difference in log-transformed time to resolution (ConvT ime) is 0.16, indicating that conver-
sations take about 17 percent longer (e0.16 = 1.17) to resolve when an SEC-affiliated lawyer
is involved. In addition, the involvement of an SEC-affiliated layer is associated with about
half an additional comment letter on average, and a nine percentage point higher proba-
bility of that the conversation takes at least two exchanges of letters to resolve. Involving
an SEC-affiliated lawyer is also associated with slightly fewer amendments and a slightly
lower likelihood of an amendment, but only the former is significant at conventional signifi-
cance levels. There is no evidence at conventional significance levels that SEC-affiliation is
associated with future conversations, restatements, or litigation.
Panels B and C of Table 6 examine the univariate differences within sample partitions.
In Panel B, the columns on the left are based on conversations where lawyer expertise is at or
below the median each year and the columns on the right are based on conversations where
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Table 6: Impact of representation by an SEC-affiliated lawyer, univariate tests
Panel A: Overall sample (N = 2,288)
Means / Prop. SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value)
ConvT ime 4.14 4.30 0.16∗∗ (1.19%)
NumLetters 5.24 5.74 0.50∗∗ (3.52%)
MultiRound 0.55 0.63 0.09∗∗ (2.46%)
NumAmend 0.27 0.18 -0.09∗∗ (1.45%)
Amendment 0.20 0.17 -0.03 (37.61%)
FutureConv 0.59 0.63 0.04 (38.40%)
FutureRes 0.13 0.13 0.00 (100%)
FutureLit 0.05 0.06 0.01 (59.62%)
Panel B: Partitioning by lawyer expertise
LawyerExp ≤ annual median LawyerExp > annual median
Means / Prop. SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value) SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value)
ConvT ime 4.13 4.30 0.16∗ (8.70%) 4.14 4.30 0.16∗ (7.17%)
NumLetters 5.22 5.85 0.63∗ (5.40%) 5.29 5.67 0.38 (25.71%)
MultiRound 0.55 0.68 0.13∗∗ (3.80%) 0.55 0.61 0.06 (28.76%)
NumAmend 0.27 0.18 -0.09∗ (9.32%) 0.26 0.18 -0.08 (10.16%)
Amendment 0.19 0.17 -0.02 (64.76%) 0.20 0.16 -0.03 (42.97%)
FutureConv 0.58 0.48 -0.10 (11.39%) 0.62 0.73 0.11∗∗ (3.77%)
FutureRes 0.14 0.14 0.003 (100%) 0.12 0.12 0.01 (100%)
FutureLit 0.05 0.06 0.01 (78.17%) 0.06 0.07 0.01 (82.47%)
Panel C: Partitioning by lawyer education
TopSchool = 0 TopSchool = 1
Means / Prop. SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value) SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value)
ConvT ime 4.13 4.24 0.11 (20.73%) 4.14 4.39 0.25∗∗ (1.21%)
NumLetters 5.19 5.57 0.39 (15.11%) 5.27 6.01 0.75 (10.14%)
MultiRound 0.55 0.64 0.09∗ (9.58%) 0.54 0.63 0.08 (21.07%)
NumAmend 0.30 0.20 -0.10∗ (6.00%) 0.25 0.15 -0.11∗∗ (2.68%)
Amendment 0.22 0.18 -0.05 (26.51%) 0.18 0.15 -0.03 (52.14%)
FutureConv 0.56 0.63 0.07 (21.21%) 0.61 0.63 0.02 (79.86%)
FutureRes 0.13 0.14 0.01 (87.35%) 0.13 0.12 -0.01 (85.18%)
FutureLit 0.05 0.05 0.00 (100%) 0.05 0.09 0.04 (27.09%)
This table documents univariate differences in comment letter outcomes when an SEC-affiliated lawyer
is involved (SEC = 1) and otherwise (SEC = 0). Please see Appendix A for variable definitions. For
the binary outcome variables (MultiRound, Amendment, FutureConv, FutureRes, and FutureLit) we
examine the difference in proportions using chi-squared tests with p-values computed by Monte Carlo
stimulation with 10,000 replicates. For the other outcome variables we examine the difference in means
using t-tests.
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lawyer expertise is above the median each year. The results suggest that much, but not all,
of the impact of SEC affiliation is driven by lawyers with lower expertise: the differences for
NumLetters and MultiRound are statistically significant among low-expertise lawyers and
clearly insignificant at conventional significance levels for high-expertise lawyers. However,
the impact of expertise is less clear for other variables. In Panel C, the sample is partitioned
on whether the conversation involved a lawyer who attended a university with a top-14 law
school. The results here are mixed; for example, the difference in ConvT ime is driven more
by lawyers from top schools, while the difference in MultiRound is driven more by lawyers
not from top schools.
6.2. Potential confounders
Other covariates, however, could confound the relationship between representation by an
SEC-affiliated lawyer and our outcome variables. For example, if SEC-affiliated lawyers are
more experienced on average, they may be more effective at helping companies deal with
SEC comments in a timely fashion due simply to their experience, which would work in the
opposite direction to our hypothesis. Alternatively, more experienced counsel may exercise
more care in dealing with SEC comments in order to protect their reputations, reducing the
timeliness of resolution.
Table 7 documents the difference between the treatment (SEC = 1) and control (SEC =
0) subsamples in each of the control variables. Panel A documents that the subsamples are
significantly different in all but one of the lawyer and law firm characteristics in our study.
Conversations involving SEC-affiliated lawyers involve slightly more lawyers on average, and
lawyers who are more experienced, less likely to be from top schools, have more degrees,
are older, and are more likely to be female. In particular, the most experienced lawyer
for a treatment conversation was involved in 2.21 conversations in the previous year on
average, more than double the average number for control conversations (0.82). Panel B
documents that treatment and control SEC conversations have statistically indistinguishable
initial comment letter characteristics, with two exceptions. Firms that retain former SEC
employees are about seven percentage points more likely to have received a comment letter
concerning accounting issues, and about five percentage points more likely to have received
a comment letter issues related to Regulation S-X.
Panel C of Table 7 documents that the treatment and control subsamples have signif-
icantly different firm characteristics. Firms that involve SEC-affiliated lawyers are signifi-
cantly larger, older, and more profitable, suggesting that hiring former SEC lawyers is more
costly on average, or that more reputable firms place greater value on the expertise or in-
fluence of former SEC employees. Treatment firms are also significantly less R&D-intensive
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Table 7: Relationship between control variables and SEC affiliation
Means / Prop. SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value)
Panel A: Lawyer and law firm characteristics
LawyerExp 0.82 2.21 1.39∗∗∗ (0.00%)
LawFirmExp 9.19 9.52 0.33 (51.52%)
NumLawyers 1.14 1.23 0.09∗∗ (1.70%)
TopSchool 0.67 0.38 -0.29∗∗∗ (0.01%)
NumDegrees 2.17 2.23 0.06∗ (8.09%)
LawyerAge 3.24 3.39 0.15∗∗∗ (0.00%)
Female 0.14 0.24 0.10∗∗∗ (0.12%)
Panel B: Initial comment letter controls
NumFilings 1.93 2.05 0.11 (17.71%)
Acc 0.78 0.85 0.07∗∗ (4.31%)
RegSX 0.17 0.22 0.05∗ (9.46%)
RegSK 0.59 0.57 -0.02 (63.81%)
Risk 0.13 0.10 -0.02 (40.56%)
Regis 0.17 0.19 0.02 (53.25%)
Other 0.83 0.83 0.002 (100%)
Panel C: Firm controls
Size 6.56 7.30 0.74∗∗∗ (0.00%)
FirmAge 2.50 2.81 0.30∗∗∗ (0.00%)
BTM 0.57 0.59 0.02 (77.33%)
ROA -0.01 0.02 0.03∗∗∗ (0.62%)
RD 0.06 0.04 -0.02∗∗∗ (0.02%)
Delaware 0.64 0.61 -0.04 (36.39%)
Domestic 0.95 0.95 -0.00 (100%)
BigFour 0.79 0.83 0.04 (20.57%)
BHR 0.08 0.07 -0.01 (85.47%)
StdRet 0.14 0.13 -0.01 (21.85%)
PastRes 0.19 0.22 0.04 (26.93%)
PastLit 0.07 0.12 0.05∗∗∗ (0.92%)
This table documents univariate differences in the control variables when an
SEC-affiliated lawyer is involved (SEC = 1) and otherwise (SEC = 0). Please
see Appendix A for variable definitions. For binary control variables, we examine
the difference in proportions using chi-squared tests with p-values computed by
Monte Carlo stimulation with 10,000 replicates. For the other control variables
we examine the difference in means using t-tests.
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than control firms. Finally, firms that involve SEC-affiliated lawyers have a five percentage
point greater probability of having faced a class action lawsuit in recent years, suggesting
that firms may view representation by a former SEC lawyer as a way to protect against
further litigation.
6.3. Descriptives before and after matching
Due to the differences between treatment and control observations summarized in Sec-
tion 6.2, our analyses control for potential confounding. We include the control variables
in our regressions to mitigate linear confounding, and also implement the two propensity
matching methods described in our research design (see Section 3.2).
Table 8 shows the impact of matching treatment (SEC = 1) and control (SEC = 0)
observations on the control variables using both matching methods.26 The two matching
procedures reduce the sample size from 2,288 to 1,529 and 1,635 respectively as observations
outside the support of the propensity score are omitted. Table 8 reports the means and
differences in means after these observations are omitted. Columns 2 to 5 are based on the
means before applying the matching weights, and columns 6 to 9 are based on the means
after applying the matching weights. Panel A of Table 8 is based on the first matching
method, in which we match along the lawyer and law firm characteristics. The differences
between treatment and control firms in most of the lawyer and law firm characteristics
are significant before weighting, but all the differences become statistically insignificant at
conventional significance levels after weighting. Panel B of Table 8 is based on the second
matching method, in which we match along all controls. After weighting, the differences are
insignificant for all controls.
6.4. Extent of negotiation
We first examine the impact of representation by SEC-affiliated lawyers in comment letter
conversations on the extent of negotiation following receipt of a comment letter. Similar to
Bozanic et al. (2017), we proxy for the extent of negotiation using the timeliness of resolution.
Our variables, ConvT ime, NumLetters, and MultiRound, are based either on the length
of the conversation in days, or on the number of comment letters in the conversation.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the distributions of the length of the conversations in days, scaled log-
arithmically (ConvT ime), and the raw number of letters in the conversation (NumLetters),
respectively. Figure 3 shows density plots, where the area of the plot within a given range
give the probability that the variable falls within the range. Figure 4 shows histograms
26For brevity we only include descriptives for propensity matching based on Model 7.
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Table 8: Impact of our matching procedures on the control variables
Panel A: Matching on lawyer and law firm characteristics
Means before weighting (N = 1,529) Means after weighting (N = 1,529)
SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value) SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value)
Lawyer and law firm characteristics
LawyerExp 0.98 1.64 0.66∗∗∗ (0.00%) 1.44 1.64 0.20 (48.24%)
LawFirmExp 8.65 8.54 -0.11 (71.55%) 7.96 8.54 0.58 (68.95%)
NumLawyers 1.16 1.24 0.08∗∗ (3.47%) 1.20 1.24 0.04 (64.76%)
TopSchool 0.59 0.41 -0.18∗∗∗ (0.01%) 0.38 0.41 0.03 (50.76%)
NumDegrees 2.19 2.23 0.03 (30.45%) 2.21 2.23 0.01 (78.63%)
LawyerAge 3.31 3.37 0.07∗∗ (1.39%) 3.35 3.37 0.02 (60.63%)
Female 0.18 0.25 0.07∗ (4.70%) 0.27 0.25 -0.02 (59.69%)
Initial comment letter controls
NumFilings 1.93 2.13 0.21∗∗ (3.89%) 1.88 2.13 0.25∗∗∗ (0.47%)
Acc 0.78 0.83 0.05 (12.63%) 0.74 0.83 0.09∗∗∗ (0.80%)
RegSX 0.17 0.23 0.06∗ (7.77%) 0.14 0.23 0.09∗∗∗ (0.31%)
RegSK 0.61 0.58 -0.03 (41.40%) 0.65 0.58 -0.07∗ (8.92%)
Risk 0.14 0.10 -0.04 (25.69%) 0.13 0.10 -0.03 (38.78%)
Regis 0.17 0.20 0.04 (29.41%) 0.17 0.20 0.03 (29.52%)
Other 0.83 0.84 0.01 (86.96%) 0.82 0.84 0.02 (61.60%)
(Firm controls omitted for brevity)
Panel B: Matching on all controls
Means before weighting (N = 1,635) Means after weighting (N = 1,635)
SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value) SEC = 0 SEC = 1 Diff. (p-value)
Lawyer and law firm characteristics
LawyerExp 0.94 1.82 0.88∗∗∗ (0.00%) 1.92 1.82 -0.10 (37.42%)
LawFirmExp 9.06 8.90 -0.16 (72.79%) 7.69 8.90 1.21 (18.36%)
NumLawyers 1.17 1.24 0.07∗ (7.27%) 1.23 1.24 0.01 (73.83%)
TopSchool 0.60 0.39 -0.21∗∗∗ (0.00%) 0.39 0.39 0.01 (94.89%)
NumDegrees 2.20 2.23 0.03 (36.74%) 2.22 2.23 0.01 (63.76%)
LawyerAge 3.30 3.37 0.07∗∗∗ (0.24%) 3.39 3.37 -0.01 (61.47%)
Female 0.17 0.24 0.07∗∗ (3.53%) 0.22 0.24 0.02 (34.83%)
Initial comment letter controls
NumFilings 1.94 2.05 0.11 (49.25%) 2.06 2.05 0.00 (79.25%)
Acc 0.80 0.85 0.05 (10.46%) 0.86 0.85 -0.01 (95.76%)
RegSX 0.18 0.21 0.03 (40.75%) 0.22 0.21 -0.01 (86.11%)
RegSK 0.58 0.58 0.00 (69.84%) 0.56 0.58 0.02 (51.09%)
Risk 0.11 0.10 -0.01 (69.83%) 0.10 0.10 0.00 (95.66%)
Regis 0.17 0.20 0.03 (42.41%) 0.19 0.20 0.00 (73.69%)
Other 0.84 0.82 -0.01 (46.97%) 0.81 0.82 0.01 (70.36%)
(Firm controls omitted for brevity)
This table documents the impact of our matching procedure on the control variables. We report
the treatment and control means and the difference in means after omitting observations not in the
support of the propensity score. Columns 2 to 5 are based on the means before applying the weights
constructed by the procedures; columns 6 to 9 are based on the weighted means. In Panel A, we
match only on lawyer and law firm characteristics, and in Panel B, we match on all the control
variables. The matching is carried out within groups of years as described in Section 6.3, and the
p-values are based on t-statistics adjusted for year group fixed effects.
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scaled to proportions, so a bar shows the probability of the variable taking a given value.
The figures in red are based on conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers (SEC = 1), and
those plotted in blue are based on conversations without SEC-affiliated lawyers. In each
figure, Panel A is based on all conversations in the sample, and Panel B is based on all
conversations remaining after matching on all controls, without applying the weights.27.
Figure 3 shows that the density plots for conversation length are shifted to the right for
conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers, relative to conversations without SEC-affiliated
lawyers. In other words, the probability that a conversation takes a longer time to resolve
is greater for conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers. For example, Panel B suggests that
when ConvT ime is between about three and four, corresponding to conversations lasting
between 19 and 54 days, the probability density is greater for conversations without SEC-
affiliated lawyers. In contrast, when the length of the conversations is greater than this
range, the probability density is almost always greater for conversations with SEC-affiliated
lawyers. The confidence intervals, plotted as dashed lines, show that the average ConvT ime
is significantly different between the subsamples at the 10 percent level.
Likewise, Figure 4 shows that the distribution of the number of comment letters in the
conversation are shifted to the right for conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers, relative
to conversations without SEC-affiliated lawyers. For both the full and matched samples, the
probability that a conversation comprises four or less comment letters is greater for con-
versations without SEC-affiliated lawyers. In particular, about 30 percent of conversations
without SEC-affiliated lawyers comprise three comment letters (generally corresponding to
conversations with one round of letters exchanged), while the proportion is respectively 22
and 23 percent for conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers, in each of the samples.
Table 9 presents the results from estimating Equation 4 under several different specifi-
cations. In Panels A and B we respectively apply the two matching methods described in
Section 3.2. After matching, the sample sizes are 1,529 and 1,635 respectively, which are
lower than the full sample of 2,288 conversations because as part of the matching procedure
we omit observations outside the support of the propensity score.
The results from Panels A and B suggest that across both matching procedures and across
all four proxies for negotiation, involving an SEC-affiliated lawyer increases negotiation.
From Panel B, which reports the results after matching on all controls, when firms involve a
lawyer formerly with the SEC, the length of comment letter conversations in days is about
17 percent higher, the number of letters in the conversation is about 6.8 percent higher, and
27See Section 3.2 for details on our matching procedure
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Figure 3: Distribution of ConvT ime by SEC affiliation
This figure shows the distribution of ConvT ime, the natural logarithm of one plus the length of the conver-
sation in days, for conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers (SEC = 1, in red) and conversations without
(SEC = 0, in blue). In Panel A the distributions are based on the full sample of conversations (N = 2,288),
and in Panel B they are based on the conversations remaining in the sample after matching on all controls
and omitting observations outside the support of the propensity score (N = 1,635). The densities are plotted
using a Gaussian kernel. We indicate the means and 10 percent confidence bounds of each distribution with
solid and dotted lines respectively.
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Figure 4: Distribution of NumLetters by SEC affiliation
This figure shows the distribution of NumLetters, the number of comment letters in each conversation,
for conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers (SEC = 1, in red) and conversations without (SEC = 0, in
blue). In Panel A the distributions are based on the full sample of conversations (N = 2,288), and in Panel
B they are based on the conversations remaining in the sample after matching on all controls and omitting
observations outside the support of the propensity score (N = 1,635).
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the odds that the conversation has more than one round is about 63 percent higher.28
Panel C reports the regressions with law firm fixed effects included as controls. The
impact of SEC affiliation remains statistically significant with the inclusion of law firm fixed
effects. The coefficients reported in Panel C are larger economically than that in Panels
A and B. This may be due to differences in the sample and specification; for example, the
tests presented in Panel C are restricted to comment letter conversations involving larger
law firms with at least ten conversations in the sample (see Section 3.2 for more information
on our research design).29 Panel C suggests that after controlling for law firm fixed effects,
the length of comment letter conversations in days is about 34 percent higher, the number
of letters in the conversation is about 17 percent higher, and the odds that the conversation
has more than one round of letters is about 66 percent higher, for firms that retain former
SEC employees, relative to firms that retain external counsel who were not employed by the
SEC.
6.5. Amendments
We next examine the impact of representation by SEC-affiliated lawyers on the number
and incidence of amendments filed by the firm following the commencement of the conver-
sations (NumAmend and Amend).
Figure 5 plots the proportion of comment letter conversations that result in specific
numbers of amendments (i.e. the distribution of NumAmend). The histograms in red are
based on the treatment sample of conversations involving SEC-affiliated lawyers (SEC = 1),
while the histograms in blue are based on the treatment sample of conversations involving
only lawyers who are not SEC-affiliated (SEC = 0). Panel A is based on the full sample
before matching, and Panel B is based on the sample after matching on all controls but
without weighting.30. The figures show that the distribution of the number of amendments is
shifted to the left for treatment observations relative to control observations. In particular, in
Panel B, 18.7 percent of conversations without SEC-affiliated lawyers result in amendments,
while only 13.5 percent of conversations with SEC-affiliated lawyers result in amendments.
Table 10 reports the results from estimating Equation 5 under several different specifi-
cations. In Panels A and B we respectively apply the two matching methods described in
Section 3.2. After matching, the sample sizes are 1,513 and 1,546 respectively, which are
28These are computed by taking the exponentials of the coefficients reported in Columns (1), (3), and (4)
in Panel B. For example, from Column 1; e0.159 = 1.17.
29Other than sample and specification differences, it could also be due to variation between law firms
having an opposite effect to variation within law firms.
30See Section 3.2 for details on our matching procedure
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Table 9: Representation by an SEC-affiliated lawyer and the extent of negotiation
Panel A: Matching by lawyer and law firm characteristics
Dep. Var. ConvT ime NumLetters NumLetters MultiRound
Regression OLS OLS Poisson Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SEC 0.178∗∗ 0.520∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.500∗∗
(0.070) (0.207) (0.038) (0.209)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs No No No No
Observations 1,529 1,529 1,529 1,529
Adj. / McF. R2 0.147 0.149 0.194 0.126
Panel B: Matching by all controls
Dep. Var. ConvT ime NumLetters NumLetters MultiRound
Regression OLS OLS Poisson Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SEC 0.159∗∗ 0.334∗ 0.066∗ 0.489∗∗
(0.066) (0.200) (0.037) (0.205)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs No No No No
Observations 1,635 1,635 1,635 1,635
Adj. / McF. R2 0.248 0.285 0.327 0.190
Panel C: Including law firm fixed effects
Dep. Var. ConvT ime NumLetters NumLetters MultiRound
Regression OLS OLS Poisson Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SEC 0.295∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.504∗
(0.096) (0.311) (0.054) (0.281)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167
Adj. / McF. R2 0.099 0.094 0.188 0.113
This table documents the results from estimating Equation 4 under several different speci-
fications. In Panels A and B we apply two different matching methods, and in Panel C we
require law firms to be involved in at least ten conversations, and replace LawFirmExp with
law firm fixed effects. Please see Section 3 for details on our research design and matching,
and Appendix A for variable definitions. The control variables comprise the lawyer and law
firm characteristics, initial comment letter controls, and firm controls. Year fixed effects are
based on the calendar year in which the conversation began, and industry fixed effects are
based on one-digit SIC codes. We report adjusted R2s for the OLS models, and McFadden
R2s for the poisson and logit models.
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Figure 5: Distribution of NumAmend by SEC affiliation
This figure shows the distribution of NumAmend, the number of 10-K or 10-Q amendments filed between
the start of each comment letter conversation and 90 days after the end of the conversation, for conversations
with SEC-affiliated lawyers (SEC = 1, in red) and conversations without (SEC = 0, in blue). In Panel A
the distributions are based on the full sample of conversations (N = 2,288), and in Panel B they are based
on the conversations remaining in the sample after matching on all controls and NumLetters, and omitting
observations outside the support of the propensity score (N = 1,546).
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lower than the full sample of 2,288 conversations because as part of the matching procedure
we omit observations outside the support of the propensity score.
The results reported in Panels A and B of Table 10 suggest that the number and oc-
currence of amendments resulting from comment letters are lower when a lawyer involved
in the conversation was formerly employed by the SEC. For example, based on Panel B,
which reports results after matching on all controls, comment letter conversations involving
SEC-affiliated lawyers result in about 52 percent fewer amendments relative to conversations
involving only non-SEC-affiliated lawyers, and the odds of filing an amendment are about
52 percent lower.
As in Table 9, the coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude after controlling for
law firm fixed effects (Panel C), which could be due either to variation between law firms
having the opposite effect to variation within law firms, or differences in the sample and
specification. The results reported in Panel C suggest that after controlling for law firm
fixed effects, comment letter conversations involving SEC-affiliated lawyers results in about
62 percent fewer amendments, and about a 61 percent decline in the odds of an amendment,
relative to only involving non-SEC-affiliated lawyers.
6.6. Future outcomes
Finally, we examine the impact of representation by SEC-affiliated lawyers on future
outcomes, specifically new comment letter conversations, adverse restatements, and litigation
within the two years following the start of the focal conversation (FutureConv, FutureRes,
and FutureLit respectively).
As in Tables 9 and 10, Table 11 reports the results from estimating Equation 6 under
several different specifications. In Panels A and B we respectively apply the two matching
methods described in Section 3.2. After matching, the sample sizes are 1,434 and 1,544
respectively, which are lower than the full sample of 2,288 conversations because as part of
the matching procedure we omit observations outside the support of the propensity score.
In Panel C, we include law firm fixed effects as before.
Across all model specifications—two matching methods, and with law firm fixed effects—
we find no statistically significant evidence that SEC affiliation is associated with new com-
ment letter conversations, adverse restatements, or class action litigation in the two years
following the start of the focal conversation.
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Table 10: Representation by an SEC-affiliated lawyer and amendments
Panel A: Matching by lawyer and law firm characteristics
Dep. Var. NumAmend NumAmend Amendment
Regression OLS Poisson Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SEC −0.104∗∗ −0.579∗∗ −0.446
(0.048) (0.231) (0.304)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs No No No
Observations 1,513 1,513 1,513
Adj. / McF. R2 0.190 0.266 0.175
Panel B: Matching by all controls
Dep. Var. NumAmend NumAmend Amendment
Regression OLS Poisson Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SEC −0.134∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗ −0.725∗∗
(0.041) (0.233) (0.320)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs No No No
Observations 1,546 1,546 1,546
Adj. / McF. R2 0.363 0.405 0.331
Panel C: Controlling for law firm fixed effects
Dep. Var. NumAmend NumAmend Amendment
Regression OLS Poisson Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SEC −0.169∗∗ −0.968∗∗∗ −0.941∗∗
(0.069) (0.345) (0.453)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079
Adj. / McF. R2 0.158 0.323 0.230
This table documents the results from estimating Equation 5 under several different
specifications. In Panels A and B we apply two different matching methods, and in
Panel C we require law firms to be involved in at least ten conversations, and replace
LawFirmExp with law firm fixed effects. Please see Section 3 for details on our research
design and matching, and Appendix A for variable definitions. The control variables
comprise the lawyer and law firm characteristics, initial comment letter controls, firm
controls, and the number of comment letters in the conversation (NumLetters). Year
fixed effects are based on the calendar year in which the conversation began, and industry
fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. We report adjusted R2s for the OLS models,
and McFadden R2s for the poisson and logit models.
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Table 11: Representation by an SEC-affiliated lawyer and future outcomes
Panel A: Matching by lawyer and law firm characteristics
Dep. Var. FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
Regression Logit Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SEC −0.278 0.098 0.310
(0.218) (0.435) (0.583)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs No No No
Observations 1,434 1,434 1,434
McFadden R2 0.181 0.228 0.381
Panel B: Matching by all controls
Dep. Var. FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
Regression Logit Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SEC −0.093 −0.159 0.673
(0.227) (0.394) (0.564)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs No No No
Observations 1,544 1,544 1,544
McFadden R2 0.226 0.281 0.426
Panel C: Controlling for law firm fixed effects
Dep. Var. FutureConv FutureRes FutureLit
Regression Logit Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SEC −0.133 −0.235 0.778
(0.303) (0.455) (0.650)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year & Ind. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Law firm FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,069 1,069 1,069
McFadden R2 0.149 0.218 0.294
This table documents the results from estimating Equation 6 under several different speci-
fications. In Panels A and B we apply two different matching methods, and in Panel C we
require law firms to be involved in at least ten conversations, and replace LawFirmExp with
law firm fixed effects. Please see Section 3 for details on our research design and matching,
and Appendix A for variable definitions. The control variables comprise the lawyer and law
firm characteristics, initial comment letter controls, firm controls, the number of comment
letters in the conversation (NumLetters), and a dummy variable equal to one if there was
an amendment (Amendment). Year fixed effects are based on the calendar year in which the
conversation began, and industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. We report
adjusted R2s for the OLS models, and McFadden R2s for the poisson and logit models.
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7. Conclusions
The flow of personnel and expertise from regulatory agencies to the private sector has been
the subject of debate and scrutiny by a wide range of stakeholders from advocacy groups
to academics. In particular, the revolving door spins rapidly at the SEC: between 2001 and
2012, 455 former SEC employees disclosed that they intended to represent an external party
before the SEC, and in our sample of comment letter conversations in which external counsel
were involved, 7.6 percent involved external counsel formerly employed by the SEC.31 At the
heart of the concern about the revolving door is the possibility of regulatory capture—the
risk that regulators act “in the interests of those they regulate” (Brown, 2016, p. 1).
Regulatory capture and the revolving door have been studied by the legal and political
science literatures since the 1970s. However, recent empirical evidence on the impact of the
revolving door on financial reporting is sparse, and has focused on its impact on enforcement
outcomes (deHaan et al. 2015; see also Shive & Forster 2017). Likewise, the literature on
the impact of external counsel on financial reporting is sparse likely due to data availability
limitations, but recent studies suggest that external counsel may have an important impact
on the financial reporting system in specific settings (e.g. deHaan et al. 2015, Bozanic et al.
2016, and Dechow & Tan 2017).
Our study aims to contribute to these two growing streams of research by examining reg-
ulatory capture in the SEC comment letter process via lawyers who were formerly employed
by the SEC. We identify the individual lawyers and law firms involved in SEC comment let-
ter conversations using Audit Analytics, and then construct a hand-collected dataset of the
background characteristics of the individual lawyers, including whether they were formerly
employed by the SEC (“SEC-affiliated lawyers”). We examine three sets of outcomes follow-
ing the receipt of a comment letter: the extent of negotiation, 10-K and 10-Q amendments,
and future comment letter conversations, restatements, and litigation within the following
two years.
In our first set of tests, we examine whether variation between individual lawyers is
statistically significant in explaining variation in outcomes after a firm receives a comment
letter from the SEC. Across specifications, we find that variation between individual lawyers
is statistically incremental to control variables and to law firm fixed effects in explaining
the extent of negotiation and amendment filings, and that results are mixed for future
outcomes. In our second set of tests, we examine whether comment letter outcomes vary with
31Former SEC employees’ post-employment disclosure information is obtained from POGO’s SEC Revolv-
ing Door database (see Project On Government Oversight, n.d.).
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whether an SEC-affiliated lawyer was involved, after matching on other control variables.
We find that involvement of an SEC-affiliated lawyer is associated with more negotiation
and fewer amendments, consistent with SEC-affiliated lawyers exerting their influence to
reduce compliance with SEC comments. We find no statistical evidence that retaining an
SEC-affiliated lawyer is associated with new comment letters conversations, restatements, or
litigation in the two-year window following the start of the focal conversation, which could
indicate that the influence of SEC-affiliated lawyers is persistent enough that the increased
resistance is not corrected within two years.
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Appendix A. Variable definitions
Table Appendix A.1 lists definitions for the comment letter outcome variables and the vari-
ables related to lawyer and law firm characteristics. Because our unit of analysis is the
conversation, in the case of conversations in which the firm referenced more than one lawyer
or law firm, the lawyer and law firm characteristics are aggregated as explained in the table.
Table Appendix A.1: Outcome variables and lawyer characteristics
Variable Definitions
Outcome variables
ConvT ime Natural logarithm of one plus the number of days between the first and last
comment letters in a conversation.
NumLetters Number of comment letters in a conversation.
MultiRound One if NumLetters ≥ 5 and zero otherwise.
NumAmend Number of 10-K or 10-Q amendments filed between the date of the first comment
letter in a conversations and 90 days after the last comment letter.
Amendment One if NumAmend > 0 and zero otherwise.
FutureConv One if a new comment letter conversation was initiated within the two years after
the start of the focal conversation, and zero otherwise.
FutureRes One if an adverse restatement was filed within the two years after the start of
the focal conversation, and zero otherwise.
FutureLit One if a securities class action lawsuit was filed within the two years after the
start of the focal conversation, and zero otherwise.
Lawyer and law firm characteristics
SEC One if the firm referenced a lawyer formerly employed by the SEC in a comment
letter in the conversation.
LawyerExp Number of conversations in which the lawyer was involved over the year prior to
the start of the focal conversation.†
LawFirmExp Number of conversations in which the law firm was involved over the year prior
to the start of the focal conversation.†
NumLawyers Number of lawyers referenced during a conversation.
TopSchool One if the firm referenced a lawyer who attended a university with a top-14 law
school.
NumDegrees The number of degrees earned by the lawyer, truncated on the left at two.†
LawyerAge Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years between the start of a conver-
sation and the year of the lawyer’s first degree.†
Female One if the firm referenced a female lawyer in a comment letter.
This table lists the definitions for our outcome variables and variables related to lawyer or law firm
characteristics. See Table Appendix A.2 for definitions of our comment letter and firm controls.
† We use the maximum values of LawyerExp, LawFirmExp, NumDegrees, and LawyerAge for
conversations in which the firm referenced more than one lawyer or law firm.
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Table Appendix A.2 lists the definitions for comment letter and firm controls. The
comment letter controls are based on the first comment letter in a conversation, and unless
otherwise stated, the firm controls are based on the most recent fiscal year before the first
comment letter in a conversation.
Table Appendix A.2: Comment letter and firm control variables
Variable Definitions
Initial comment letter controls
NumFilings The number of filings referenced in the initial comment letter.
Acc One if the comment letter mentions accounting rule issues, and zero otherwise.
RegSX One if the comment letter mentions Regulation S-X issues, and zero otherwise.
RegSK One if the comment letter mentions Regulation S-K issues, and zero otherwise.
Risk One if the comment letter mentions risk factor issues, and zero otherwise.
Regis One if the comment letter mentions registration issues, and zero otherwise.
Other One if the comment letter mentions issues coded by Audit Analytics as not fitting
other categories, and zero otherwise.
Year FEs Based on the calendar year in which a conversation began.
Firm controls
Size Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization (Compustat: prcc f×csho).
FirmAge Natural logarithm of one plus the public age of the firm, defined as the number
of days between the first comment letter in a conversation and the firm’s first
appearance on CRSP, divided by the average number of days in a year.
BTM Common equity (ceq) divided by the market value of equity (prcc f × csho).
ROA Income before extraordinary items (ib) scaled by average assets (average at).
RD R&D expense (rd) scaled by average assets (average at).
Delaware One if the firm is incorporated in Delaware (incorp = “DE”), and zero otherwise.
Domestic One if the firm is domestic (loc = “USA”), and zero otherwise.
BigFour One if the firm is audited by a Big 4 accounting firm (au is non-missing and
strictly less than 9) and zero otherwise.
BHR The firm’s raw buy-and-hold return over the 12 months before the first comment
letter in a conversation.
StdRet The standard deviation of the firm’s raw monthly return over the 12 months
before the first comment letter in a conversation.
PastRes One if the firm recorded an adverse restatement within the three years up to the
start of a conversation.
PastLit One if a securities class action lawsuit was filed within the three years up to the
start of a conversation.
Industry FEs Based on one-digit SIC codes.
This table lists the definitions for our comment letter and firm control variables. See Table Ap-
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